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Abstract: This article aims to discuss Kang Youwei’s康有為 (1858–1927) position on
democracy and republicanism in China through the analysis of two major works of
his late production: Datongshu 大同書 (Book of Great Concord, drafted in 1902,
but only published posthumously in 1935) and Gonghe Pingyi 共和評議 (Impartial
Words on Republicanism, 1917), seemingly presenting two opposite views on the
same issue.Whereas in hismost “esoteric”production, representedby theDatongshu,
Kang prophesied the spread of democracy on a global scale (China included), he
remained loyal to the prospect of a Chinese constitutional monarchy in his public
appearances after 1911 – the same he had abortively sponsored during the Hundred
Days’Reformof 1898. In 1917, playing an active role in the short and somehow farcical
restoration of the last Manchu emperor on the throne orchestrated by warlord Zhang
Xun, Kang published Impartial Words on Republicanism, a significant essay through
which he intended to explain the apparent contradiction between his republican
utopia on the one hand and his “imperial” project on the other. Through the transla-
tion and discussion of some extracts from the two aforementioned works, I will try to
shed more light on Kang’s complex views on the issue and on the ambivalence of his
political and theoretical agenda. Finally, I will also suggest that Kang’s reflections
may appear to have been successively echoed by later intellectuals in the debate on
the possibility and nature of a “Chinese democracy”.
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1 Questioning Republicanism: Kang Youwei
and the 1917 Monarchic Coup
On July 1, 1917, general Zhang Xun張勳 (1854–1923) – a former protegé of Yuan
Shikai – marched to Beijing to restore Xuantong 宣統, the last emperor of the
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Qing, on the throne. Kang Youwei 康有為, the respected philosopher who had
earned a place in history for leading the unsuccessful attempt to reform the
Empire from the inside during the notorious Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, and
who had been opposing nationalist republicans and Yuan Shikai’s ambitions for
more than a decade in the name of constitutional monarchism, had arrived in
Beijing four days before the announcement of the coup. Previously, he had also
directly urged Zhang Xun to take the capital by force several times since June.1
After drafting an edict celebrating the restoration, Kang promptly resumed his
main proposals for a comprehensive reform of the Empire – a renewed policy to
be called the “Chinese Empire” (中華帝國) rather than the Great Qing – used 19
years earlier.2 His edicts, ignored by Zhang Xun himself, were even more
unsuccessful than those of 1898: If at that time Kang’s attempt to change
China had lasted barely three months, this time it did not outlive the span of
two weeks. By July 12, the Republic was back in Beijing.
However “farcical” it may seem now, the abortive restoration of 1917
appeared at that time as a significant symptom of China’s chaotic situation
after the death of Yuan Shikai, the man who had acted as the only center of
gravity left in a young republic: The country was still on the verge of collapse,
ready to be divided among the new warlords and its sovereignty to be carved out
by foreign powers. Yuan’s failed imperial restoration moreover had demon-
strated how ideologically fragile republicanism still was: The taboo of the
“return of the emperor” had been readily infringed, and thanks to the
Republic’s failures monarchical ideas had proven to be still alive and usable
for political purposes. The coup d’état cost much to Kang, who, being already in
dire straits with the new intelligentsia, was definitively labeled as an anti-
Republican, nostalgic conservative.
In an attempt to rebuff these critiques, Kang that same year published a long
essay in three parts in the journal Buren 不忍,3 expressing his own views on
republicanism and democracy: Gonghe Pingyi 共和評議 (Impartial Words on
Republicanism).4 Written while he was a political refugee in the American
Legation, and issued in Shanghai as a book in 1918, it adds some new con-
siderations and insights to earlier arguments on Chinese and international
politics.5
1 Hsiao 1975: 253
2 Zarrow 2012: 262–263. On Zhang Xun also see Wang 1998: 272.
3 Buren 不忍 was published in Shanghai from 1913 to 1917, edited by Kang himself together
with his disciples Chen Xunyi 陳遜宜, Mai Dinghua 麥鼎華 and Kang Siguan 康思貫.
4 This is the translation proposed by Hsiao 1975.
5 Hsiao 1975: 257.
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In particular, its third section, titled “On how the Book of Great Concord,
which I wrote thirty years ago, firstly addressed the issues of democracy and the
Republic, and how it was too advanced for the Chinese people”, is both a
passionate defense of Kang’s commitment to democracy and a lucid analysis
of China’s structural weaknesses. In the second paragraph, Kang directly
addresses his fellow citizens, waving his Datongshu 大同書 as proof of his
sincere commitment to the development of democratic institutions in future
China.
Kept unpublished by Kang himself – except for two chapters, which
appeared again in the journal Buren in 1913 – and finally published posthu-
mously in 1935, the Datongshu is considered one of Kang’s major works. Partly
translated into English by Lawrence Thompson in the 1950’s, the Book of Great
Concord – whose first draft was completed as early as 1888 – ambitiously
stretches the author’s own progressive interpretation of Classicism – matured
through his New Text scholarship – to the limits, vividly depicting the Age of
Great Peace as the final stage of human history, foreseen by Confucius and
encoded in his historical commentaries. Though commonly labeled as an
utopia, the book lacks the “out-of-time” dimension proper to Western utopias
(like those of Thomas More, Bacon, and Campanella), rather being a prophecy
of the world to come, as well as an interpretive history of mankind up to the
author’s time. Applying the Chinese ideal of datong 大同 (Great Concord) on a
global scale,6 Kang argues that in less than two centuries men and women will
overcome their racial, sexual, social, cultural, religious and economical
boundaries; unified by a world-government of illuminati and perfected by
magnificent technological progress, the world will be at peace.7 Democracy
and republicanism will be the foundations of this new world order, Kang
assures. The whole planet will be a public (gong 公) political entity, eradicat-
ing selfishness (si 私) and division.
How could such a view, which will be presented in more detail in the
paragraph below, coexist with the conservative positioning of 1917? Kang uses
the Datongshu itself as the bedrock of his defence.
6 On the emergence of the datong ideal and on its long-lasting impact on Chinese history, see
Pines 2012: 11–43. I have chosen to translate datong as Great Concord, adopting Kang’s own
proposal for the English translation of his book’s title. Alternative (and more frequent) transla-
tions of the term include Great Unity or Great Commonwealth.
7 For a general summary of the Datongshu, see Thompson 1958 and Hsiao 1975: 419–513.
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My fellow countrymen, you say that I am defending monarchy against democracy? What
about the fact that thirty years ago I wrote about the Great Concord, exposing the theory of
a world in which citizens will share suzerainty? I was the first, in our country. My Book of
Great Concord, which describes the three ages of the world, was published in the eighth
issue of this journal, in the eighth month of 1913, and I ask you, my compatriots, to read it
carefully. If you read it, how will you be able to say that I have opposed democracy?8
And indeed, the Datongshu proves to be a sincere example of the author’s
commitment to his own ideal of world democracy.
2 Dreaming of a Global Commonwealth:
The Datongshu and Mankind’s Progression
to Democracy
“When the Great Way was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled
all-under-Heaven”, reads the Book of Rites.9 As Kang’s disciple Liang Qichao
later wrote in his survey on the Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period, published
in 1927 and translated into English by Immanuel Hsü in 1959, the foremen-
tioned passage from the Confucian Classic if “translated into modern terms,
contains the idea of democracy, a League of Nations, public upbringing of
children, sickness and old-age insurance, communism and the sanctity of
labor”.10 And Kang’s Book of Great Concord, especially in those sections
describing the establishment of a World Parliament, of a global welfare
systrem and the abolition of any form of private property – proves that he
shared such a visionary interpretation of what the Book of Rites may have
actually implied. But what kind of democracy does Kang dream of, in his
description of the world to come? Does it imply the existence of different
political parties contending for power as in the classical Western liberal
democracy? Does it envision the election of public officials? Does it rely on
checks and balances and on the division of power or is it rather a universal
application of the Mencian principle by which “unity is stability”, and con-
sequentially “division (or pluralism) means instability”, hence transferring the
8 “吾國民乎？得無以我偏主民主，而攻民主乎？然吾三十年前，發大同之說，明天下為公民
有之義，舉國莫我先也。吾《大同書》言合國三世表，已於癸丑八月印在第八卷中，請吾國民
疑我者細讀之。吾國民覽此乎，吾豈偏攻共和民主者乎？Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1047.
9 Legge 1885: 366.
10 Liang 1927: 96.
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imperial concept of gong 公 into an institutional framework in which there is
no emperor and yet there still is only one dao 道, one valid principle of
government and there is no real competition between different alternatives?
In other words, where do the roots of Kang’s democratic ideal lie, and what are
its concrete consequences in political terms?
Leaving behind the main examples of what we could call a “debate on
democracy” in the Confucian tradition – such as the Mencian theory of minben
民本, or “people-at-the-basis”,11 or the reflection on the “democratic” role
played by grassroots rebellions throughout imperial history12 – it is well
accepted that a new page in the history of Chinese political thought was opened,
quite forcibly, after the first comprehensive contact with the West, starting from
the last decades of the Great Qing’s rule over China.
In those years “democracy” and “republicanism” – both understood as
generally vague categories, often idealistically abstracted from their concrete
manifestations – entered the Chinese debate on the country’s future as a symbol
of Western supremacy in the eyes of those intellectuals who were at the time
passionately trying to repair the crumbling imperial system. From the point of
view of the reflection on political organizations and historical development, the
impact of the translation of John Fryer’s Political Economy, presenting a three-
stage evolutionary theory of institutional systems – monarchy, oligarchy and
democracy – can be considered as a watershed.13 Only a few years after the
Manchu Court impotently witnessed the breakup of China and the obvious
failure of the ti-yong 體用 slogan (“Chinese essence, Western tools”) elaborated
by Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837–1909), under which the yangwu movement’s
efforts to modernize China had been advanced for three decades and which had
dodged any discussion on the imperial system at large, the doors were finally
opened to the discussion on the responsibilities of traditional political culture as
a whole for the decline of the country.
In this context, Kang and his disciple Liang Qichao梁啟超 (1873–1929) must
be counted among the most prominent thinkers trying – though in slightly
different ways – to transplant statism, the main feature of nineteenth-century
11 As Andrew Nathan correctly pointed out, minben “has never meant people’s rights (minquan)
or people’s rule (minzhu)”. (Nathan 1985: 127).
12 Yuri Pines notes that “rebellions can be interpreted as a peculiar (and very costly) readjust-
ment system, a kind of bloody popular ‘election’”; at the same time “any new rebel-turning-
emperor served as a proof that there was no real alternative to the political system established
in the aftermath of the Warring States” (Pines 2012: 161).
13 On this, and more generally on late-Imperial and early-Republican political and philosophi-
cal debate, see Zarrow 2012.
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Western political theory,14 into Chinese political culture, thus underlining the
necessity to restructure the Empire in order to fence off the external aggression
and encounter the internal centrifugal forces.
However, Kang’s intellectual efforts, unquestionably stimulated and
strengthened by his encounter with the West – indirect at first, and then
personal in his later years – were only superficially influenced by European
philosophical thought. Rather, it appears as a heterodox offspring of Chinese
tradition, modeled by the global tides of the long nineteenth century forcing its
interaction with “foreign” currents.15
As Philip Kuhn has argued in his essay on the imperial legacies of the
modern Chinese State, wide sectors of the so-called gentry from the late Ming
onward started to claim more significant participation in the public sphere,
laying the foundations for later political debates.16 In this context, the New
Text school interpretation of Confucianism, which Kang would take to its
extreme, emerged among some illustrious gentry lineages of seventeenth-cen-
tury Central China as a reaction to their exclusion from central administration;
veiled under a philological debate on the Classics, a voluntaristic vision of
Classical philosophy and the subsequent call for a renewed participation in
state affairs by the local elites were pursued, as Benjamin Elman has extensively
pointed out.17 It was an invitation to the literati to abandon their passive
acceptance of orthodoxy and of an unquestioned imperial rule in favor of a
vigorous and active political action: Confucius himself, New Text thinkers
claimed, although unquestionably devoted to tradition, was a sort of
“uncrowned king”, a prophet and an active political leader. His words were
less an empty homage to past kings and venerable rites than an invitation to act
in the present. This interpretation of Classicism came to Kang through its
14 Statism, more than nationalism, can be considered the major external influence on Chinese
political thought through the so-called “long nineteenth century”. For a recent view of this
theme from a global perspective, see Osterhammel 2014: 572–629; for Kang’s own theory of
statism, see Zarrow 2012, esp. ch. 1–3.
15 Kang was certainly influenced by Western technical knowledge, first through Japanese
translations and later thanks to his extensive journeys through Europe and the Americas. The
Datongshu itself, with its huge presence of Western citations witnesses Kang’s sincere interest in
“foreign” phenomena and practices. My point, however, is that from a strictly philosophical
point of view, Kang’s thought was fully developed within the framework of Chinese Classicism,
albeit through an unorthodox lens. Western elements appear as examples validating his own
ideas and theories, especially when it comes to the so-called “material culture” (scientific and
economic progress) for which Kang highly esteemed Europe and the USA. On this, see Wong
2008: 15–26.
16 See Kuhn 2002 and Pines 2012.
17 See Elman 1990.
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Guangdong agents, at the Xuehaitang Academy,18 but was rethought and
reshaped under diverse influences, finally coalescing into his famous political
call-to-arms, Confucius as a Reformer 孔子改制考, written in 1897 and serving
one year later as the ideological basis to the abortive 1898 Reforms.
For Kang and his followers, the main urgency before and after 1898 was to
support the establishment of a “public-minded rule” (gong 公), in contrast to a
“selfish” (si 私) vision of power which, in their opinion, had progressively
weakened the Empire.19 Clearly, the direct participation in the state by the
whole of the Chinese people was not even an issue: If seen under this light,
democracy “has a lot more to do with the empowerment of the people in the
state than it does with a concept of top down state power”.20
Kang’s proposed reform of monarchy, then, was much more indebted to
statism than to a general plea for people’s participation. And yet, democracy and
even republicanism were not simply discarded by Kang. On the contrary, they
were considered as one of the markers of the “end of history” and the attainment
of the Great Concord prophesied by Confucius.
The following extract from the Datongshu – a “table on the advancement of
human equality” left untranslated by Thompson – will serve as a useful com-
pendium of Kang’s blueprint for a global commonwealth. It is one of
many tables provided by the author throughout the book, with the intent of
summarizing the history of the past – analyzing, for example, how tribes,
18 The Xuehaitang (‘Hall of the Sea of Learning’), founded in Guangzhou by governor-general
Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764–1849) in 1821, served as a major cultural hub in Southern China for
almost a century, “transplanting” the new philological and philosophical currents of Jiangnan
and mingling them with more local cultural (and social) concerns. For a detailed history of
Xuehaitang see Miles 2006.
19 As Kang himself explained in his commentary on the Book of Rites, “to constitute all-under-
heaven [tianxia] in a public space [gong] means that each and every man is treated in one and
the same way”. (Liyun zhu, quoted in Hsiao 1975: 199). More generally, the speculation on the
difference between public-minded and selfish-oriented politics certainly does not appear for the
first time in late Qing. The famous historian Ma Duanlin 馬端臨 (1254–1323), who lived in
Mongol-ruled China during the Yuan dynasty, in his masterwork Wenxian Tongkao 文獻通考
used the categories of gong and si as key elements in the understanding of China’s historical
evolution through the different dynasties of the past, noticing, for example, that “ancient
emperors never considered the world as their private property” (古之帝王未嘗以天下自私也).
For a survey of the concepts of gong and si in the Datongshu, see Huang 2002. In this article, I
have generally translated gong as ‘public’, although it must be noted that in late Imperial China
it was also used to define the sphere of action of the local gentry rather than of the Imperial
State, therefore appearing more similar to a Western concept of “civic space”. On this, see
Rankin 1993 and Rowe 1993.
20 Kane 1990: 8.
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kingdoms, empires and nations have constantly tended towards an ever wider
unification – and anticipating the next steps of human evolution up to the
attainment of its final stage.21
人類平等進化表 Table: Progression to mankind’s equality
據亂世 Age of Chaos
人類多分級。 Mankind is extremely divided.
有帝，有王，有君長，有言去君為叛逆。 There are emperors, kings, princes; those who claim
the abolition of monarchs are considered to be
rebels.
以世爵、貴族執政，有去各分爵級者，
以為謬論。
Noblemen and aristocrats exert power; the idea of
overcoming class and grade distinctions is
considered as heresy.
有爵，有官，殊異於平民。 There are noblemen and functionaries, both
separated from common people.
有天子、諸侯、卿、大夫、士。 There is the Son of Heaven, then princes and dukes,
ministers, high officials and literati.
有皇族，機貴而執權。 At the top of aristocracy, there is an imperial
lineage which exerts power.
有天僧，為法王，法師，法官。 There is a Grand Priest, acting as King of the
Dharma, Master of the Dharma and Judge of the
Dharma.
族分貴賤多級，仕宦有限制，賤族或不
得仕宦。
Social classes are numerous; access to official
positions is limited; low people are excluded.
族分貴賤，職業各有限制，不相同。 The population is divided among noblemen and low
people, the system of working classes is rigid and
no passage from one category to another is
allowed.
女子依於其夫，為其夫之私屬，
不得為平人。
Women are their husbands’ property and respond
to them; they are not valued as equal [to men].
一夫多妻，以男為主，一切聽男子所為。 A husband can have more than one wife and exerts
his masculine authority: Whatever he says, he must
be obeyed.
族分貴賤，多級，各不同婚姻。 Population is divided in many classes and inter-
class marriage is not allowed.
(continued )
21 In the Shanghai Zhonghua edition of 1935 it is published as part of Chapter 4, whereas in the
more recent version based on a manuscript found in Hangzhou, it is part of Chapter 2.
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(continued )
人類平等進化表 Table: Progression to mankind’s equality
據亂世 Age of Chaos
種有黃、白、棕、黑貴賤之殊。 The existing races are the following ones: yellow,
white, brown and black, from the highest to the
lowest.
黃、白、棕、黑之體格、長短、強弱、美
惡迥殊。
Yellows, whites, browns and blacks present clear
differences of physique, stature, strength and
beauty.
白、黃、棕、黑之種不同婚姻。 Yellows, whites, browns and blacks cannot marry
[someone of another race].
主國與屬部人貴賤迥殊。有買賣奴婢。 Citizens and rulers are strictly separated. There are
slaves and servants.
Source: Kang 2010: 79–80.
升平世 Age of the Rising Peace
人類少級。 Mankind is less layered.
無帝王、君長，改為民主統領，有言立帝
王、君長者為叛逆。
There are no emperors and kings, nor princes;
democratic leadership has emerged. Those who
claim their will to establish a dynasty are fought
as rebels.
無貴族執政，雖間存世爵、華族，不過空
名，無政權，與齊民等。
Power is not exerted by aristocrats; noblemen and
members of high families, albeit still surviving, are
considered as equals – they only keep their titles,
without exerting any authority.
‘無爵，有官，少異於平民，而罷官復為
民。
There is no nobility; there are only functionaries
slightly differing from common people; when they
cease from their duty, they return to be common
citizens.
官級稍少。有統領、大夫、士三等。 The grades of government officials are less
numerous, reduced to three: the president, high
officials and functionaries.
皇族雖未廢而僅有空名，不執權。 The imperial family has not been abolished yet.
However, it enjoys a merely nominal prestige,
without exerting any real power.
削法王，猶為法師、法官、議員。 There is no Grand Priest anymore; however, the
roles of Master of the Dharma and King of the
Dharma still exist, albeit covered by an official.
(continued )
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(continued )
升平世 Age of the Rising Peace
雖有貴賤之族而漸平等，皆得仕宦。 Class differences still exist, and full equality has
not been attained yet; however, every citizen can
become a public official.
雖有貴賤之族，而職業無限，得相同。 Population is still divided among noblemen and
common people; however, the system of working
classes is not rigid and moving from one class to
another is permitted.
女子雖不為夫之私屬而無獨立權，不得為
公民、官吏，仍依於其夫。
Women are no longer their husband’s property;
however, they are not yet fully autonomous, they
cannot exercize their rights as citizens nor can
they be public officials. They are still dependent
on their husbands.
一夫一妻，仍以男為主而妻從之。 Each husband can have only one wife. He still
exerts his masculine authority, though, and his
spouse has to obey him.
族雖有貴賤而少級，婚姻漸通。 The population is divided into classes, but to a
lesser extent. Inter-class marriage is permitted.
棕、黑之種漸少，或化為黃，隻有黃、
白，略有貴賤而不甚殊異。
Blacks and browns have gradually decreased, or
they have merged into the yellow race; there are
only yellows and whites, although not so strictly
separated.
棕、黑之種漸少，或化為黃，隻有黃、
白，略有智愚而不甚懸絕。
Browns and blacks have gradually decreased, or
they have merged into the yellow race, and there
are only yellows and whites: they still present
differences – although not in an extreme fashion –
in terms of intelligence
棕、黑之種漸少，或化為黃，隻有黃、
白，雖有長短、強弱、美惡而不甚懸
絕。
Browns and blacks have gradually decreased, or
they have merged into the yellow race; there are
only yellows and whites: they still present
differences – although not in an extreme fashion –
in terms of physique, stature, strength and beauty.
棕、黑之種漸少，各種互通婚姻。 Browns and blacks have gradually decreased, and
interracial marriage is allowed.
主國與屬部人民漸平等，不殊貴賤。放免
奴婢為良人，隻有雇仆。
The people and the rulers are progressively
considered to be equal, not separate classes.
Slavery is abolished, and servants are retributed.
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太平世 Age of Supreme Peace
人類齊同無級。 Mankind, devoid of divisions, attains unity.
無帝王、君長，亦無統領，但有民舉議員以
為行政，罷還復為民，有言立統領者以為
叛逆。
There are no emperors, kings nor leaders, only
representatives of the people taking care of
public affairs; once their appointment has
ceased, they return to being common citizens;
those who proclaim their intention to become
leaders are fought as rebels.
無貴族、賤族之別，人人平等，世爵盡廢，
有言立貴族、世爵者，以為叛逆。
There are no aristocrats separated from
commoners: persons are all equals, nobility
has been abolished and those who proclaim
their intention to establish a clan or a house
are fought as rebels.
民舉為司事之人，滿任復為民，不名為官。 Those who act as representatives, once their
appointment has ceased, return to being
common citizens and they do not retain the
qualification of ‘functionaries’.
官級極少。隻有大夫、士二等。 The grades of government officials are few.
There are only two of them – high officials and
functionaries.
無皇族。 There is no imperial lineage.
無大僧。 There is no Supreme Priest.
無貴賤之族，皆為平民。 There are no classes – citizens are equal.
無貴賤之族，職業平等，各視其才。 There is no aristocracy and there are no low
people; professions are all considered as
having the same dignity and everybody follows
their talent.
女子有獨立權，一切與男子無異。 Women are autonomous, fully equal to men.
男女平等，各有獨立，以情好相合而立和
約，有期限，不名夫婦。貴賤之族，婚姻
交通皆平等。
Men and women are equal and free. Those who
share reciprocal love can sign a fixed term
contract of partnership, which is not a
‘wedding’. Inter-class marriage is allowed.
黃、白交合化而為一，無有貴賤。 Yellows and whites mingle to form one race,
with no discrimination.
諸種合一，並無智愚。 All races have unified, with no differences in
intellect.
諸種體格合一，皆長，皆強，皆美，平等不
甚殊。
All racial types have unified; therefore, there
are no differences of stature, strength and
beauty.
(continued )
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As simple as this chronological progression from the Age of Chaos to the Age of
Supreme Equality may appear, it still leaves some open questions lingering.
As anticipated earlier, we might first have to ask if Kang’s concept of democ-
racy,muchmore rooted in “equality” (公) than in “freedom” or “pluralism”, fits into
a Western understanding of democracy as the competition and/or regulation of
private interests, representing that very same “selfishness” (私) against which Kang
firmly stands. One of Kang’smain concerns, which he had been expressing since his
early political writings, is the construction of a “world where the hierarchical
distance between people and their rulers and between different individuals in
their social relations would be markedly diminished”.22 The Datongshu’s social
ideal thus gravitates around “the elimination of political, racial, sexual and national
barriers, not so much because these hierarchies were evil, [but] because all differ-
entiation of phenomena obscures the truth that on the level of philosophic truth
‘reality’ is ‘one’”, as Charlotte Furth put it.23 It appears more like amoral ideal, often
pervaded by a sort of mystical aspiration to mankind’s salvation, than a concrete
political concept, hence showing once again its debt to Confucianism and
Buddhism. Given that the search for gong 公 and tong 通 – the rule by the
public good and the abolition of distances, be they geographical, social or
economic – seems to be the core value of Kang’s own concept ofminzhu, his vision,
taken to its extreme, can lead to results which appear quite distant from a Western
liberal concept of democracy. For example, the racial policies illustrated in the
previous table undoubtedly constitute a significant example of such a different
orientation. To Kang’s eye, the idea of a universal racial assimilation, causing the
extinction of “less-developed” human ethnic groups, might have been perceived
as a positive historical outcome, signifying the abolition of one of the most heinous
(continued )
太平世 Age of Supreme Peace
諸種合一無異，互通婚姻。 All races have unified and interracial
partnerships are free.
無主國屬部，人民平等。 There is no such thing as a ‘governing class’ –
people are equal.
人民平等，無奴婢，亦無雇仆。 Since people are equal, there are no slaves nor
retributed servants.
22 Furth 2002: 20.
23 Furth 2002: 22.
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boundaries that divide individuals.24 To our eyes, though, it is a rather sinister
anticipation of twentieth century racial discrimination and even extermination
policies. When differences are considered as an enrichment rather than a brake to
mankind’s progression towards a better future, Kang’s ideal of democracy centering
around the notion of unity as the abolition of diversity, assumes a somewhat
undesirable flavor, to put it mildly.
Second, once Kang’s specific concept of democracy is better clarified, can
we consider his vision for the future of mankind at odds with his role in China’s
political arena in the first decades of the twentieth century? This presumed
contrast was especially visible after the Xinhai Revolution, when Kang, as we
have seen, publicly assumed a much more “conservative” stance, defending the
idea of a constitutional monarchy even when such a stance patently seemed a
move back towards a dismissed past: In almost twenty years, China had so
profoundly changed that the previous reformer now appeared as a staunch
nostalgic betraying his earlier progressivism and his dream of a worldwide
datong.
3 Training for Democracy: Kang Youwei
and the “Fount of Time”
Now back to the Gonghe Pingyi. The contrast between the political agenda lying
behind Kang’s 1917 essay and his private dream of democracy has been readily
pointed out. The point is this: Why was Kang actively pursuing the restoration of
monarchism in China while considering the abolition of kings and emperors as a
necessary step towards a global datong? The solution, partly anticipated above,
is provided by the general framework of Kang’s philosophy of history. Adapting
the classical “three ages” theory of human development, Kang considers democ-
racy (minzhu 民主) and the Republican regime which is its most perfect realiza-
tion as the ultimate institutional form in the evolution of mankind towards the
Age of Great Concord. Hence, building a democracy is a universal goal rather
than a local matter of “values” and/or “cultural identities”. At the same time,
however, whether these universal trends can be realized in any specific context,
is a matter of time and circumstances. And China at the beginning of twentieth
century was not ready for it yet, according to Kang.
24 Kang’s opposition to any political platform based on “racial discrimination” is evident in
some of his pamphlets and essays written against Chinese Nationalists, witnessing his sincere
commitment to a very Confucian universalism. See Brusadelli 2014.
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I did not dare to speak publicly of democracy, believing that its time had not yet come. As
the Invariable Mean says, “vast and profound is the fount out of which time flows”. And in
the Analects, it is said that: “The phoenix sits on the mountain’s peak, oh times, oh times!”
The Book of Changes reads: “Great thing indeed is to follow the times”. Fur in winter, hemp
in summer: These are people’s normal clothing. If I wore a fur in June, would I not die from
heat? And if I wore hemp in January, would not I suffer cold? So I believe that this hour, in
which we confront ourselves with the Great Powers, is not the hour of democracy for us. It
is not that I don’t have hemp or fur: I store them in the cupboard, waiting for their time to
come; similarly, I hold in great esteem the discourses on democracy and on republicanism,
but I have stored them, waiting to use them when the time of Great Concord comes. Today,
my fellow citizens wrongly believe that democracy is fit for this time; but wearing a fur in
summer you die from the heat, wearing a hemp in December you die from cold. I see it,
and dread. I cannot help weeping their bitter fate, urging them to change their clothes.25
Republicanism needs a democratic terrain out of which it can develop. It cannot
be imported nor transplanted, Kang points out:
I think that for thousands of reasons it [establishing democracy and a republic in China] is
not possible; because among one hundred republics you will not find two equals; due to
historical, geographical and cultural factors, [a republic] cannot be imitated nor is there a
universal technique to preserve it.26
According to Kang’s self-defence, then, the effort to restore Qing rule in 1917,
albeit on new premises, should not be seen as contradicting his utopian dream
of a global democracy. Rather, it is based on a pragmatic evaluation of the
actual circumstances of China. The utopia of Great Concord is not betrayed, but
“maintained”, waiting for the right time to come. If the unquestioned goal of
history is unity, the fact that it could be achieved by China simply dismissing the
Empire is far from evident, Kang argues. Even less if the new Chinese state is to
be based on “racial” and “divisive” premises, as he frequently underlines in his
anti-Republican essays.27
25 然我且不敢言民主共和者，誠以未至其時也。《中庸》曰：“浦博淵泉，而時出之。”上
《論》末章曰：“山梁雌雉，時哉時哉。”《易》曰：“時之為義大矣哉。”夫冬裘夏葛，人之常
服也，若五月披裘則喝死，十二月衣葛寒侵，吾以今列國競爭之時，非行用民主之時也。吾非
無裘葛也，藏之篋笥，待其時而用之，吾於至珍民主共和之說，亦藏之篋笥，待大同時而用
之。今吾國民，誤行民主於今，則五月披裘，當喝死也，十二月衣葛，當冷死也。吾見而懼
之，不能不苦口流涕，而勸其易服也。Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1047.
26 吾即以為萬不可行，百國共和，又無一同者，吾即自有歷史地理風俗，不可效人，則無一
術維持共和矣。Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1047.
27 On this, especially on Kang’s stance against Han nationalism as the main ideological factor
behind Chinese Republicanism, see Brusadelli 2015.
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Kang’s proposal for the institutional resurgence and reform of the Empire is
better defined in the following passage, where he displays his passion for world
and comparative history, nurtured by his international peregrinations since the
exile of 1898, as documented in his biography and travel diaries.28 Again, the
starting point is a classic quotation: A hexagram from the Book of Changes – the
“headless dragons” – serves here as an introduction to the author’s own theory
of constitutional monarchism.29
I imagined it for China, thinking carefully, and studying deeply, considering the features
of uncountable countries, collecting good examples, ancient and modern, and finally
building my own theory. For a long time I have retained it, but now I intend to hand it
over to you, my fellow citizens. Confucius thus comments on the qian hexagram from the
Book of Changes: “To see dragons with no head. Auspicious”. The Commentary of the
Images says: “Qian originally uses nine and rules the world”. Where do its political
implications lead us to? To Greece, where there was an assembly of people chosen for
their merits; to Rome, where there were a Senate and a triumvirate, with senators all
chosen for their political prominence or for their personal reputation. To Germany, where
seven Prince-electors used to nominate the king; to Switzerland, where there are seven
ministers who in turn act as president for a year-long mandate; to the United States of
America, where each State chooses two delegates for the Senate, which is charged with
supervising the President and controlling him on foreign policy and great issues; to
France, where the President has ceremonial functions but no actual power and admin-
istrative functions belong to the cabinet; to the time of Tang Yao,30 who consulted with
the four Yues for important issues; or to the time of the Zhou, when the Republic of Zhou-
Shao was established.31
28 For an account of Kang’s journeys, see Lo 1967. In the Datongshu, large sections dealing
with the historical evolution of the world up to the twentieth century might be considered as
“comparative history” rather than “utopian fiction”, as already pointed out in paragraph 1. This
is not to suggest that the author’s activity as a historian meets our scientific standards, but it
certainly was a “scientific” accomplishment in the eyes of a man who, like Kang, was influ-
enced by Confucian historiography.
29 The image of “headless dragons” has been diversely interpreted throughout the centuries,
as a group of dragons physically with no heads or as a group without a head or leader. Kang
seems to follow the latter, to justify his ideal of an “empty monarchy”. Legge has a completely
different translation: “If the host of dragons (thus) appearing were to divest themselves of their
heads, there would be good fortune” Legge 1885.
30 Tang Yao, one of the Five Legendary Emperors, according to the myth lived in around
2200 BCE.
31 In ninth century BCE, following a rebellion against the tyranny of King Li of Zhou, the new
king – Xuan of Zhou – decided to share his power with Duke Mu of Shao and Duke Ding of
Zhou; this institutional experiment was later dubbed “Zhou-Shao Republic” (周召共和). This
episode is mentioned by Sima Qian in the Shiji.
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Now, drawing inspiration from the sentence of Master Kong, and taking into account the
foreign systems of Greece, Rome, Switzerland, America and France, as well as the domestic
ones of Tang Yao and the Republic of Zhou-Shao, melting them together and harmonizing
their different flavors, can [the result] be something fit for us? Aside from a National
Assembly, I therefore propose to establish a Senate as the highest institutional body of the
country, with the 22 provinces plus Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Qinghai sending a repre-
sentative each; and if there is someone of great virtue and of great learning whose
provincial seat has already been filled, he can nonetheless be nominated by the Senate
as a member of the assembly; of the 28 members, seven are chosen in turn as standing
members; the administration of the State is divided into five offices: one is called ‘Foreign
Affairs’, dealing with the great issues of foreign relations; one is called ‘Military Affairs’,
declaring wars and making peace, with the Marshall of the Army being subject to the
cabinet; one is called ‘Law’, deciding on great judicial matters; one is called ‘Political
Stability’, deciding on political litigations; one is called ‘Education’, being responsible for
national education and not subject to the policies of the cabinet; in addition, a president
and a vice-president of the assembly are chosen, following the Swiss system, where in case
of illness or absence of the president, the vice-president acts as his substitute”. 32
The 1917 project, when seen from this perspective, was not a simple dynastic
restoration, as it may have seemed to Qing nostalgics, such as Zhang Xun
himself. Rather, it implied an almost revolutionary change of perspective: The
power of the monarch had to be scooped out, leaving only his sacral charisma
and ceremonial duties. Such an institutional asset serves as the main feature of
Kang’s theory of the empty monarch in which, following a fully statist approach,
Kang moves sacrality “from the king to the state”.33 Quoting the Book of
Changes, the “head” is cut off and the empire is transformed into a ‘public’
32 吾為中國計之，昧昧我思之，沈沈吾畫之，斟酌萬國之宜，薈萃古今之美，無亦有一創說
焉。懷抱之久，今願以敬獻吾國民。孔子系《易》之乾曰：“見群龍無首。吉。” 象曰：“乾元
用九，天下治也。” 此其政治之極軌那？其在希臘，則有賢人會議﹔其在羅馬，則有元老院及
三頭政治，其元老皆選專於政治而有重望者元焉。德國則有七選侯以選立王者，其在瑞士則以
七部長，歲選議長﹔其在美國則以每周選二人為上議院議員，以監督總統，握其外交及大政﹔
其在法國則有代表王之虛總統與責任內閣﹔其在唐堯則大政咨於四岳﹔其在周室則周召共和。
吾今上稟孔子“群龍無首”之言，外採希臘、羅馬、德、瑞、美、法之制，內採唐虞四岳，周召
共和之法，合一爐而冶之，調眾味而和之，其貨可行乎。請於國會而外，立元老院為最高機
關，凡廿而行省，及內外蒙古、西藏、青海、各公舉一人，入充元老，其有大功德、大文學，
雖其省額滿，亦可由元老公請入院，額數以廿八人為度，輪選七人為常，駐辦事員分五司焉：
一曰外交，凡有外交結約之大事者斷焉﹔一曰兵，凡開戰議和，及參謀部元師府隸焉﹔一曰法
律，凡大審判決焉﹔一曰平政，凡政之訟決焉﹔一曰教，凡國教任，凡不隸於內閣之大政隸
之，更公舉一議長，一副議長，其議長之制如瑞士，其議長以病或事缺席，則副議長代之。
Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1047–1048.
33 Chang 1987: 5–6. Kang’s theory of the “empty-monarch” is thoroughly examined in Zarrow
2012: 24–55.
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(gong) polity ruled through a diffused and multilayered institutional system.
Moving one step further towards the “age of democracy”, then, constitutional
monarchism is considered as closer to the Age of Supreme Peace than a fragile
republic built on wrong premises and incapable of reforming the country, rather
functioning as a screen for old-fashioned authoritarianism (as the years of Yuan
Shikai’s rule over China had suggested): “Introduced without an intervening age
of constitutional monarchy, and amid great confusion, to a largely unprepared
population, the Republic, not surprisingly, malfunctioned”.34 Consequently, in
Kang’s opinion, restoring and adjusting the Empire may be a way to gain time
and prepare China for the Age of Rising Peace without causing the country to
collapse backward into chaos. Constitutional monarchy is the solution, as Kang
had already claimed in his essay “Saving the Country” (Jiuwanglun 救亡論),
published in 1911:
Constitutionalism is a great revolution, the right revolution for a country that has been a
monarchy for millennia. This year’s revolution, on the contrary, is nothing but a small
revolution; it is a ‘one people, one dynasty’ revolution, with the purpose of taking power
back to the hands of the Han people.35
The historical linearity pointing to the Great Concord does not imply a sort of
“institutional linearity”: A non-public (and therefore non-democratic, according
to Kang’s vision) Republic, may be more chaotic and even less democratic than a
monarchy based on the revival of gong. This point, in particular, is developed in
the first paragraph of Gonghe Pingyi’s third essay, “Rome and England both
passed from democracy to monarchy, attaining a new strength” – another
example of Kang’s fascination for comparative and global history ante litteram.
Those who say that establishing a monarchical system after democracy is not possible
shall change their mind. Was not Rome, in ancient times, a democracy? Since Augustus,
though, it became an autocratic monarchy, and it prospered, expanding its rule over
thousands of li, governing Europe until the age of Constantine: For two thousand years
it was a great empire. Until recent times, England and Wales were small and uncultured
democratic countries. Then monarchy was established and in 300 years the kingdom
conquered the Netherlands, later conquering India and colonizing Canada and Oceania.
It is today a great country, whose flag waves everywhere in the world.36 Now, can we deny
34 Pines 2012: 168
35 故言立憲者，大革命也，革數千年國為君有之命。今號革命者，小革命也，僅革一朝一族
之命而已，其為復漢人之權利則一也。Kang 1981: vol. 2: 668.
36 This point of England being a republic which successfully turned to monarchism is widely
used by Kang, see for example his telegram to Feng Guozhang, mentioned in Hsiao 1975: 255.
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that Rome and England are both countries ruled by law? From small and weak barbaric
countries to great and powerful empires, is this not what we call progress? But maybe it is
not enough to convince those who believe that after democracy it is impossible to establish
monarchy. Germany, for example, today exerts a huge influence: It has just taken the city
of Riga away from the Czar, and is now heading to the Russian capital with its army.
A democracy which cannot exert its full control over the country can hardly be strong. The
United States of America is the best example of a democratic system; however, they have
declared war on Germany, sending its citizens to the battlefield for many months,37
because when war is unavoidable, that is not the moment for people’s rule [democracy].
As for today, what time is it for us? Isn’t this the time of war, for our country? Please, my
fellow citizens, follow and value these considerations.38
The previous passage is also a useful indication to better frame Kang’s general
views on democracy. We have seen that in his writings – in particular those
presented in this paper – democracy and republicanism often appear as syno-
nyms, indicating a political system in which, all citizens being equals, there is
no room for a monarch and where common people can temporarily serve as
administrators of the common good. This would suggest that in Kang’s scheme
constitutional monarchy would represent a stage prior to a full-fledged gonghe.
Such a conclusion, although much debatable from a Western perspective, is
indeed consistent with Kang’s choice for constitutional monarchy as the fittest
institutional framework for China at his time. Also, Kang’s remarks on the
presumed weakness of democratic institutions in war times might be interpreted
not as a diminution of democracy’s value or effectiveness, but as the application
of his theory on historical progression: As the last stage of human development,
democracy can work only if the Age of Concord is fully attained on each level. It
can therefore express its full potential only when conflicts are quelled and peace
and equality thrive throughout the globe. This scheme may lack the depth of
contemporary reflections on democracy, yet it is Kang’s theoretical framework as
derived from unorthodox Confucianism.
Finally, in the third section of the third essay of Gonghe Pingyi – explicitly
entitled “Chinese people, citizens of a country which has never been a
37 Kang refers here to World War I.
38 或謂民主之后不可改君主，改則退化，其謬至易知矣。羅馬之先，豈非民主乎？而自奧古
士多之后，改為專制君主，羅馬乃盛，拓地萬裡，為歐正統，至君士但丁，二千年為大帝國
矣。至今英克林威爾民主也，在小國未文明時，其后英改為郡主，垂今三百年矣，始收荷蘭，
滅印度，定加拿大及澳洲，英乃曰大，英旗於日月出入。羅馬與英，豈不足稱法乎？由弱小
蠻，進為文明霸國，非進化乎？此之不足，而謬雲民主之后，不可改為君主。今德國已勝勢，
取俄裡加，已為全軍扑俄京。蓋民主之國勢難統御，無能強其國者。美為民主政體至今美矣，
然日號其民，欲與德戰，而招兵數月，故國爭未免之時，非行民主制之時也。今何時乎？豈非
國爭時乎？請懸記其得失以覘之。 Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1046.
22 Federico Brusadelli
democracy, ignore what a republic is and that is why they are foolishly
losing their struggle” – Kang returns to many of the previously examined points
(i. e. the need for a full comprehension of republicanism as a product of specific
historical and social circumstances, the peculiarities of twentieth-century China
and the dangers of an extemporaneous or “copied” democracy), adding precise
accusations to his contemporary Republican and nationalist intellectuals.
They may claim to be sincere democrats, and yet they still act as imperial
censors, condemning and ostracizing counter-current thinkers such as him,
Kang denounces:
My fellow intellectuals, aiming for higher discourse and pressing the times, are forcing it
[i.e. the establishment of a republic] without having actually reflected critically upon it,
even for one single day. […] You can establish a school following a teacher only after
receiving teaching [from him]; you can set up a strategy only if you are trained in it. That is
because in order to pass on their knowledge, their experiences and their activities, people
need to master them through many years of study and many years of exercise. Only then
they can be implemented. Every art is subtle and studying it seems hard for a long time.
Thus a republican system is a similarly manifold, subtle and abstruse matter. Recently,
among our country’s scholars of America and Europe, many have used Japanese transla-
tions as short-cuts, but Japan does not have a republican system and [those translations]
do not give details on republicanism! So, if before the Xinhai Revolution in China there was
not a single book on republicanism, since then, in the entire country there has not yet been
a single true scholar of republicanism. […] Following my return to China I have met not a
few scholars: Old students know much about China and ignore the outer world; new ones
have superficial knowledge of the outer world and do not understand China. Talking about
“foreign studies”, Europe, America, Asia and Africa are different and distant. It is difficult
to visit them all, their systems are manifold and ever-changing and it is difficult to study
them all. Talking about a republic, under its name only a general idea is included and
examining its actual content you may see its inevitable variations, the whole course of its
institutional forms, its pros and cons, as well as the reciprocal followings and imitations:
among the many republican countries throughout history, not a single one is similar to
another, and even Rome did not follow the example of Greece. The seventy-two cities of
the Hanseatic League did not follow Rome, the Commune of Florence did not follow
Germany, the Swiss Confederation did not follow the Italian Communes, the United
States did not follow Switzerland, France did not follow America, Portugal did not follow
France, and the twenty American Republics may look similar from the outside but from the
inside are actually different; coming to the European revolutions, they followed up the
American and French examples, they took the essence of the republic, distilled it and
caught its spirit without necessarily copying its formal appearance, and this ultimately
shows the wide transformative power of republicanism. Name and reality differ, but those
who only have a superficial knowledge ignore it and are misled. So, the republican system
considers the nation as a public affair and the country as a people. It is a peaceful common
vision, and it is in this sense different from autocracy. France is a purely republican
country, but among the parties today [represented] in Parliament there is still a party
marked as “monarchical”; moreover, the German Empire is considered by many to be an
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autocracy. The German Socialist Party is now represented in Parliament and publicly
discusses democracy … French Monarchists express their own views although republicans
have extensive prejudices against them, condemning and debating their ideas. Because a
republic is to be considered as the representation of the ideas and visions of every person,
putting together their multiplicity, it cannot force everyone to promote democracy. If there
are taboos, that is, a suppression of citizens, it is an autocracy, not a republic. Our country,
since 1912 has reformed its institutional system, becoming a republic, and nobody dared to
discuss it. If someone does not advocate democracy and republicanism, and he openly
speaks out, he is immediately viewed as a traitor, as in the former Empire, when those who
talked about democracy were considered rebels. The intellectuals of our country have
preserved the bad habits of the Empire, and albeit enchanted by republicanism they are
actually practicing autocracy. Somebody should dare to ponder on the pros and cons of the
Republic, to ask whether it is fit for China’s geography, habits, history and sensibility, to
examine it critically, inviting intellectuals and scholars from all over the country to reflect
on it again and again, balancing gains and losses and only then implementing it. Even if
they have not analyzed it thoroughly yet, and even if they ignore the possibility to
implement and enforce it, they wish to attain the benefits and security of a republic –
which they consider as a sine qua non for the interests of the country and the wealth of the
people – therefore causing troubles and losses. […] Now, we will not reply here to the
ancient scholars’ attacks on democracy; however, how can I deny that among the numer-
ous Chinese modern intellectuals there is not a single one who has a clear understanding
of what a republic is? Because, if they had a deep knowledge of its perils, they would first
of all admit that it is completely unfit for China. They should be denounced publicly as if
they were rebels: in order to protect themselves, they are not brave enough to speak
openly; aspiring for rank and wealth and hoping to jump on the Republic to gain some
power, they do not dare to express themselves.39
39 然犹必立学从师以受之，设局整陈以操之，入传习所、试验场、作工厂以习之，需以数年
之学力，尚须实地练习者数年，然后乃施之实用焉，然后可占其能否。夫以工艺之微，学之犹
若是至难且久也，况夫共和政治之深繁奥赜也。近者吾国求欧、美之学，多假途于日本之译
本，而日本既非共和政体，其于共和政皆语焉而不详，故辛亥以前，吾国竟无共和政体之一
书，即辛亥以后，全国亦未有共和政体之一学。[…] 吾归国以来，所接人士，不为少矣，其旧
学者，多知中而寡知外； 其新学者，略知外而不知中。就言外学，则欧、美、亚、非，地势廖
远，游者难于遍至，国体整变，学者难于尽悉。就言共和，举其广名，则大略若同，考其内
实，则无不变异，其立法之本末，成效之得失，相师互鉴，而古今万国之共和，无一同者，故
罗马不师希腊也。德之汉堡七十二市府，不师罗也，意之佛罗练士五市府，不师德国也，瑞士
联邦，不师意大利之五市府也，美不师瑞，法不师美，葡不师法，而美洲之二十共和国，外全
相似，内实不同，至欧洲诸国之革命，则尽以美洲、法国为戒，取共和之精华，而去其糟粕，
得其神意，而不必泥其形似，此尤共和变化之至者矣。名实少异，宜浅识者不知而反惑也。且
夫共和之制，以国为公有，全国之民，和平公义之也，此所以异于专制也。故法国为纯粹共和
之国，而今议院之政党，尚有特标明为王党者，甚至德之帝国，几为专制矣。而德之社会党，
乃于议员公言民主之制，而奥无论也。法之王党，各发其心思议论，虽共和党之偏至极端者有
驳难而无非议之。盖以共和者，为代表全国人之心思议论，从其多数而行之，非强人人之必言
民主也。若有所禁，则是遏抑国民也，是专制也，非共和也。 吾国自壬子以后，改国体为民主
共和，无人敢议之者。其有不言民主共和，而他及者，即视若悖逆，有若昔日帝国之言民主，
视为叛乱焉。盖吾国之学者，皆染中国帝国之余风，虽心醉共和，而实行专制若也。然则谁敢
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The conclusion, for Kang, is unquestionable: At the moment, “The Republic and
China cannot stand together”:
For six years democracy has brought disasters to our country, and its advocates
have trapped 400 million Chinese into this tragedy; those who are aware of it and yet
do not talk – some for fear, some for interest – do not love their country anymore. To say it
simply, the Republic and China cannot stand together. When the Republic was established,
China was lost; if the Republic endures, China will disappear. My fellow citizens, please,
think about it with a fair mind, if you still love China.40
4 Conclusion: Training for Democracy?
As summarized in the previously examined “tables on mankind’s progression to
equality”, Kang in his Datongshu prophesied that the “end of history” will
manifest itself as a global democracy, a one-world republic tearing down bar-
riers and boundaries, whose nature has been briefly examined as implying more
than one difference from the classical Western ideal of democracy.
However, while revising and completing his utopia, Kang acted on the
political stage of China as a critic of republicanism, confronting publicly Sun
Yatsen and Yuan Shikai, and even attempting in first person to restore the last
Qing emperor on the throne, as the failed coup of 1917 demonstrates.
In this framework, the interest of a work like Gonghe Pingyi does not lie
exclusively in its being an anti-Republican manifesto. Kang himself used this
work to present his comprehensive view on the future of China, somehow
justifying his plea for a renewal of the Empire in a country which had just rid
itself of its last dynasty in the name of modernity. As Kang underlines in the last
passage of Gonghe Pingyi, republicanism and democracy are “practices” which
need training (cao 操) in order to be successfully mastered. In synthesis, Kang
“rested his arguments sometimes on theoretical grounds, that is, political
以共和之得失利害，宜于中国地理风俗历史人情与否，考而辩之，更安能集一国学士大夫、通
人才士讲求反复，穷极得失，而后行之。夫既未尝考辩讲求，不知其可否而强行之，而欲其得
共和之宜，受共和之安，以为国利民福，必不可得也，故召乱败也。[…] 夫旧学之攻民主者不
论，虽然，吾国新学者至多，吾岂敢谓其无一通共和者.盖新学者深知其害，而谓万不可行于中
国者固有矣。然以得罪于众， 等于叛逆，以保身家，故不敢昌言，或心既利禄，欲乘民国而图
权利，至不敢微言。Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1049–1051
40 夫是以民主之害国殃民者六年，而议共和者无之，是以陷中国四万万人至于此惨也，有所
畏，有所利，知而不言，皆不爱国而已。要之一言，民国于中国不并立，民国成则中国败矣，
民国存则中国亡矣，吾国民爱中国乎，其平心思之。Kang 1981: vol. 2: 1051.
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change must be compatible with the historical circumstances prevailing at a
given period of time”, consequently viewing republicanism as something that
“was intrinsically desirable but lay beyond China’s immediate reach”.41
Furthermore, Kang’s attack on his fellow intellectuals who act with no
respect for the Chinese situation reminds us of more recent confrontations on
the exportation of democracy in alien contexts. “Few, if any, Western liberal
democratic theorists in the post-World War II era have sought to learn from the
traditions and experiences of East Asian societies […] and defenders of ‘Asian
values’ are viewed as archaic or politically dangerous”.42 This contemporary
address by Bell to Western intellectuals’ “provincialism” may have sounded
familiar to Kang’s ears, who – as we have seen – directed similar accusations
against Chinese political theorists: copying the West in order to compete is not
the solution. China must recover with its own remedies, they said. The theore-
tical consistency, and the actual feasibility, of a democracy based on the
Classical Chinese political vocabulary appears problematic, both today and at
Kang’s times. Indeed, minzhu and gonghe can mean all and nothing, appearing
in human history under many disguises, as Kang himself interestingly observes
throughout his work. Again anticipating more recent approaches to the issue,
Kang affirms that if democracy is to be considered as an exceptional European
or American phenomenon, then it has nothing to do with China, due to the
extreme dissimilarities in terms of historical evolution between East and West.
However, whereas democracy is scraped of its “Western-superiority” veneer and
fully understood in all its differences and complexities, then it may also be
considered as already being a part of Chinese historical legacy. Just as the
historian Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) found some democratic seeds in the Song
dynasty examination system,43 Kang considered the mythical virtuous kings of
41 Hsiao 1975: 220.
42 Bell 2006: 4.
43 In a nutshell, Qian Mu stated that whereas the West had established “contractual” institu-
tions (from the Magna Charta onwards), accepting and even prescribing a dialectic interaction
between the “people” and the “ruler” (with the former attempting to somehow control the
latter), communities in China had rather chosen to historically “entrust” their ruler(s), thus
producing a hierarchical and familistic sociopolitical system based more on “responsibility”
and “moral expectations” than on reciprocal suspicion or the search for a balance of powers.
Defying the mainstream bias towards Chinese autocracy, seen as one of the key elements in
China’s backwardness vis-à-vis the West, Qian shifted his argument further: China had even
experienced a sui generis form of “representative democracy”, embodied by the examination
system as implemented from the Song dynasty to the last years of the Qing; this peculiar form of
interaction between the literati and the State, in Qian’s view, supplied the Empire with a sort of
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Zhou as valid an example of democracy as the actual institutions of France or
the USA, and to the question of whether a meritocratic oligarchy can be con-
sidered a form of “democracy”, Kang answered that yes, a constitutional mon-
archy with a nominal emperor at the apex legitimating a mechanism of checks
and balances below can be more public-minded (and therefore “democratic”)
than an autocratic republic.44
Finally, the self-evident divergence between the project of a constitutional
monarchy and the dream of a global democracy is explained by Kang as present-
ing a difference in time and not in ideals or values. Showing a pragmatic – more
than “gradualist”, as Hsiao Kung-chuan defined it – approach to historical
evolution, Kang clearly states that democracy and republicanism will eventually
thrive on a global scale, but also that each community will reach that point at its
own pace. As it was pointed out earlier with regard to Kang’s comment on the
“weakness” of democratic institutions in times of war, monarchism and repub-
licanism are not wrong or right in their own terms: They can only be valued in
relation to the circumstances generating and sustaining them. If they follow the
“flow of time”, they will function correctly. Understanding the “vast and deep
source of time”, as the Invariable Mean prescribes, is the only way to save a
country on the brink of collapse. Kang thus stresses timeliness as one of the most
important virtues in politics, paying his debt to classical Chinese philosophy and
strategy.45
In the debate on whether Confucianism can generate democracy – which,
far from being a historical curiosity, has been a key point in recent decades,
both in Taiwan and in the PRC – Kang assumed a purely Confucian and
“universalist” approach. His main concern was not the definition of a
Chinese cultural model – a “national essence” – as opposed to the Western
one, but the understanding of how China can generate its own “democratic”
system in the long term. “Superficially, democracy may appear as a universal
value, in a ‘every street leads to Rome’ fashion; and in today’s world, the
“meritocratic government”, thus providing a fruitful connection between the local power of the
so-called gentry and the central authority of the dynastic administration. See Qian 2012: 98–99.
For a summary of Qian’s position in the debate on “Confucian Democracy”, see Deng 2009.
44 For a recent view on the issue of meritocracy vs democracy in a “Confucian” context, see
Bell and Li 2013.
45 On the importance of shi势 (momentum, disposition) in Chinese traditional strategy, and its
implications in the construction of a concept of ‘efficacity’ fairly different from the Western one,
see Jullien 1997
“You Don’t Wear a Fur in Summer” 27
political systems realized by numerous countries may seem to have similar
features, all known as ‘democracies’. However, the historical roots of each
country’s realization of democracy are actually different, and the effects of
democracy in each country’s modern and contemporary historical develop-
ment are equally dissimilar”.46 Almost a century after the publication of
Gonghe Pingyi, and more than fifty years after Qian Mu’s reflections, this was
the premise of sociologist Fang Ning房寧 in the introduction to his essay “The
Chinese Experience with Democracy”. Underlining China’s historical, geogra-
phical, social and cultural peculiarities in comparison to the West, and exten-
sively stressing how democracy can be inflected differently in different places
and times, Fang seems to share Kang’s inclination for the contextualization of
political systems (although his conclusion is a negation of the possibility for
China to have a multi-party system, conversely envisioned by Kang in his
constitutional monarchy project).
Kang’s focus on the creation of a gong polity and his vision of Datong, on the
other hand, have been often used by Wang Hui 汪輝 – a “new-left” intellectual
who supports “grassroots democracy” experiments in the PRC and urges the
emergence of “social groups” rather than “political parties” as a counterbalance
to a capital-driven CCP.47 The fact that two intellectuals providing substantially
different solutions for contemporary China can both claim a part of Kang’s
legacy certainly shows the latter’s pivotal role – his political failures and short-
sightedness notwithstanding – in the shaping of modern and contemporary
Chinese thought.
Being more focused on the comprehension of ever-changing circumstances
in time, than on the definition of some given identities in space, Kang was
unsurprisingly a minority in a world set on fire by the quest for “national
characteristics” as the reasons behind each country’s failures or successes.
However, it would be ungenerous not to assess Kang’s importance as a witness
to and interpreter of his troubled time, or to underestimate the significance of
his intellectual wandering between utopianism and realism – here briefly
traced through the analysis of two of his writings – as embodying a funda-
mental feature of Chinese intellectual and political history, both before and
after 1911.
46 《从表面上看，民主似乎是一种“普世价值”，似乎“条条大路通罗马”，当今世界上多数国
家采取的政治制度在形式上是类似的，都被称为民主政治。但是，实际上各国实行民主政治的
历史原因有差别的，民主政治在各国近现代历史发展所起的作用也不尽相同。》Fang
2013: 1–2.
47 On both Fang and Wang, see Leonard 2008.
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